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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20000549-CA
v.

Priority No. 2

ALAN VAL McDONALD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(i)
(1998), and one count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (1999), both third degree felonies. This Court
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress when
defendant failed to demonstrate the invalidity of the warrant or the
inapplicability of the good faith exception?

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court's underlying
factual findings are reviewed deferentially and reversed only for "clear error." See State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Wright, 1999 UT App 86, f 6, 977

P.2d 505. Its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of
discretion" in the application of legal standards to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 93540; Wright, 1999 UT App 86, f 6.
2.

Was the invalidity of the search warrant established as a matter of
res judicata?

Whether res judicata applies is a question of law reviewed for correctness. PGM,
Inc. v. Westchester Investment Partners LTD., 2000 UT App. 20, f 3, 995 P.2d 1252.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of possession of stolen property, a
second degree felony; one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, both third degree felonies;
and one count each of possession of paraphernalia, and interference with a peace officer
making a lawful arrest, both class B misdemeanors (R. 1-2). Following the denial of his
motion to suppress, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the two third degree
felony charges (R. 106-113). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years probation
(R. 133-36). Defendant timely appealed (R. 128).
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a
warranted search of defendant's residence in Uintah County. See Br. of Appellant at 1.
The events giving rise to this warranted search began with a burglary in Duchesne
County, followed by a stop of defendant's vehicle at an administrative checkpoint in
Wasatch County (R. 60).
The Burglary and Administrative Checkpoint
In May 1998, a residential burglary occurred in Duchesne County in which
approximately fifteen firearms and several thousand rounds of uniquely labeled
ammunition were taken (R. 60).
On 23 May 1998 officers stopped defendant's vehicle at an administrative
checkpoint in Wasatch County (R. 43, 60). Officers at the checkpoint recovered a .45
caliber semi-automatic pistol, a .22 caliber pistol, and ammunition bearing the same label
as that taken in the Duchesne County burglary (R. 60). Officers also recovered several
articles of drug paraphernalia from defendant's vehicle (R. 59). Checkpoint officers
arrested defendant and impounded his vehicle (R. 59).
The Search Warrant for Defendant's Uintah County Residence
Officers then obtained a warrant to search defendant's home in Uintah County (R.
43, 54, 59).* Officers executed the warrant and discovered a substance that they believed

1

Neither the search warrant, nor the affidavit submitted in application for the
warrant is included in the record. The record contains an "Affidavit of Probable Cause"
(R. 55-60). That affidavit, however, seeks an arrest warrant for defendant.
3

to be methamphetamine, several items of drug paraphernalia, and a Colt .25 caliber semiautomatic handgun (R. 42, 53-54, 58-59).
The Ruling Invalidating the Administrative Checkpoint
After the warranted search of defendant's residence, the administrative checkpoint
in Wasatch County was apparently ruled invalid because of a notice problem (R. 42, 64).2
Defendant then filed a motion to suppress in this case, arguing that the search warrant for
defendant's residence was based entirely on evidence obtained at the administrative
checkpoint (R. 41-43) (a copy of defendant's motion to suppress is attached as Addendum
A). Defendant reasoned that the ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint
rendered the evidence seized from his residence "fruit of the poisonous tree" and also
established the illegality of the warranted search as a matter of res judicata (id.).
Defendant Fails to Appear at the Hearing on the Motion to Suppress
The hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was originally set for 29 June 1999
(R. 45). Defendant's counsel requested a continuance on the grounds that he had a
scheduling conflict and that the State had stipulated to the continuance (R. 46-47). The
trial court granted defendant's request and continued the suppression hearing to 14 July
1999 (R. 48).
Neither defendant nor his counsel appeared at the 14 July hearing (R. 52).
Defendant was free on bail at the time (R. 12,16). The trial court allowed the State to

2

The only references to a ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint are
unsupported statements in defendant's motion to suppress and the State's objection to the
motion to suppress.
4

submit its response to the motion to suppress through affidavit, rather than finding
defense counsel in contempt and issuing a warrant for defendant (R. 52). In its opposing
memorandum, the State argued that the warrant was valid on its face (R. 64) (a copy of
the State's objection to the motion to suppress is attached as Addendum B). The State
also argued that if the warrant was invalid, the good faith exception applied (R. 62-64)
add. B. The State also submitted the affidavit of officer Dylan Rooks who participated in
the execution of the search warrant (R. 53-54) (a copy of Officer Rooks' affidavit is
attached as Addendum C). Officer Rooks' affidavit stated that only "a portion of the
information contained in the affidavit of probable cause was gathered in the course of an
administrative traffic checkpoint..." (Id.).
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress based on the State's
memorandum (R. 66) Br. of Appellant at Addendum E.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to demonstrate any error in the trial court's ruling denying his
motion to suppress. The record contradicts defendant's claim that the search warrant was
the fruit of the poisonous tree and therefore invalid on its face. Even if the warrant was
invalid, the trial court correctly applied the good faith exception. Defendant's inadequate
briefing on this issue fails to demonstrate otherwise.
Defendant also fails to demonstrate that collateral estoppel applies. He has not
shown that the warranted search of his residence was ruled illegal in any prior
proceeding.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ERROR IN
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING

Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress
evidence seized at his residence pursuant to a search warrant. Specifically, defendant
claims that the search warrant for his Uintah County residence was based entirely on
evidence obtained at an administrative checkpoint and that the checkpoint was apparently
ruled invalid after the execution of the warrant. See Br. of Appellant at 4. Therefore,
according to defendant, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Id.
The State argued below that defendant "fail[ed] to address the facial validity of the
warrant in this case" (R. 64) add. B. The State also argued that even if the warrant was
invalid, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied (id.). The trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress "based on [the] State's memorandum in opposition
and [the] cases cited therein" (R. 66). Defendant fails to demonstrate any error in the trial
court's ruling.
A.

Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in
finding that the warrant was facially valid.

Defendant has not shown that the warrant was invalid because it was the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." First, no order or ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint
appears in the record. Thus, nothing in the record establishes that the "tree" from which

6

the warrant was derived was even "poisonous." Rather, it appears that the parties below
simply assumed the illegality of the checkpoint (R. 42, 64) add. B and C.
Even assuming that the administrative checkpoint was illegal, the record does not
support defendant's contention that the search warrant was based entirely on evidence
obtained at the checkpoint. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the evidence before the
trial court on the motion to suppress was that only "a portion of the information contained
in the affidavit of probable cause was gathered in the course of [the subsequently
invalidated] administrative traffic checkpoint..." (R. 53) add. C. Defendant did not
offer any contradictory evidence. In fact, the search warrant and the affidavit submitted
in application for the warrant do not even appear in the record on appeal.
To establish that derivative evidence is the fruit of a prior illegality, defendant
must demonstrate that the evidence "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality...
." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441
(1963). The record demonstrates, however, that the search warrant was not based entirely
on evidence obtained at the checkpoint (R. 53) add C. Even if the checkpoint was a
"poisonous tree," defendant has not demonstrated that the search warrant was obtained by
exploitation of the apparently illegal checkpoint, and thus "fruit of [that] poisonous tree."
See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417.

7

B.

Defendant has inadequately briefed the issue of whether
the good faith exception applies.

The State also argued below that even if the search warrant was defective, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied (R. 62-64) add. B. The trial court
agreed (R. 66). Defendant has not demonstrated that this ruling was erroneous.
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue. He fails even to list it as an issue on
appeal, or separately discuss it in his brief. See Br. of Appellant at 1, 4-6. His argument
regarding the applicability of the good faith exception consists of three sentences devoid
of citation to the record or any legal authority. See id. at 4-5. His brief, therefore, fails to
satisfy the requirements of rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this
Court should refuse to consider this issue. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ct. App. 305,
1Hf 25,27, 989 P.2d 503 (refusing to consider inadequately briefed issue).
In any event, a respectable body of authority supports the trial court's ruling
regarding the applicability of the good faith exception. Several federal circuit courts of
appeal have applied the good faith exception to a warranted search when the warrant
affidavit contained information that was only later determined to have been
unconstitutionally obtained. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v.
Thornton, 766 F.2d 39, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984); but see United States v. Wanless, 882
F.2d 1459, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the good faith exception cannot apply in
such circumstances).

8

II.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE ELEMENTS
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Defendant also argues that previous rulings in Wasatch and Duchesne Counties
established the invalidity of the warranted search of defendant's Uintah County residence.
See Br. of Appellant at 5-6. Thus, according to defendant, the issue preclusion aspect of
res judicata, also known as collateral estoppel, prevented the State from introducing in
this case, the evidence obtained from the warranted search of his residence. See id.
Defendant, however, has not established the elements of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel applies if each of the four following requirements are satisfied:
First, the issues in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully,
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action
or a privy of the party.
Collins v. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, 2000 UT App 371, f 8, 16 P.3d 1251.
Defendant fails to demonstrate the first element, identity of the issues. Defendant
refers to previous rulings in Duchesne and Wasatch Counties. See Br. of Appellant at 5.
There is no evidence in the record, however, of any Duchesne County ruling on the
legality of the .warranted search of defendant's residence. The motion and order to
dismiss entered by Judge Payne in Duchesne County, attached as Addendum D to
defendant's brief, is not part of the record and is subject to the State's motion to strike,
submitted with this brief. Even if defendant's Addendum D were part of the record, it
would not establish that the issues in the Duchesne County case were identical to the
issues in this case. Defendant's Addendum D does not even mention the search warrant
9

executed at defendant's Uintah County residence. Rather, defendant's Addendum D only
establishes that the State dismissed its case against defendant because the evidence
obtained at the administrative checkpoint had been suppressed. "[Djefendant bears the
burden of demonstrating that the issue was actually decided in his favor in the [prior]
proceeding." State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1231 (Utah 1998). Absent such a
demonstration, defendant's assertion that collateral estoppel applies based on a Duchesne
County ruling is simply an unsupported unilateral allegation.
The record does mention a Wastach County ruling invalidating the administrative
checkpoint (R. 42, 64). But that ruling is only mentioned in the fact statements of
defendant's motion to suppress and the State's objection to the motion (id.). No ruling or
order from Wasatch County appears in the record. The unsigned minute entry of Judge
Bumingham in Wasatch County, attached to defendant's brief as Addendum B, is not part
of the record and is also subject to the State's motion to strike.3 The same is true for the
motion and order for dismissal of a case against defendant in Wasatch County, attached to
defendant's brief as Addendum C. Thus, nothing in the record establishes that the
validity of the warrant to search defendant's Uintah County residence was previously
adjudicated in"Wasatch County.
Even if these documents were part of the record they do not establish that the
issues in Wasatch County were identical to those in this case. The Wasatch County case

3

The unsigned minute entry lists a Bart Woodcox as defendant and does not
indicate that Mr. McDonald participated in the hearing.
10

apparently concerned the validity of an administrative checkpoint and the suppression of
evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop at that checkpoint (R. 42, 64) add. A and B.
This case, however, concerns the legality of a warranted search of defendant's residence
in Uintah County. While the Wasatch County ruling may collaterally estop the State from
relitigating the validity of the checkpoint, it does not estop the State from litigating, for
the first time, the validity of the warranted search of defendant's residence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this ^[5

day of April, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on 25

April 2001,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two accurate

copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
Michael L. Humiston
23 West Center Street
P.O. Box 486
Heber City, UT 84032
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MICHAEL L. HUMISTON #6749
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 128
Myton, Utah 84052
Tel/Fax: (435) 646-3280

•IV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
Case No. 991800030
ALAN VAL McDONALD,
Defendant

Hon. John R Anderson

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully moves the court to suppressfromadmission as evidence
at trial all evidence against the Defendant obtained pursuant to warrant issued in consequence of an
administrative roadblock held in Wasatch County on May 23,1998.
FACTS
1. On May 23, 1998, Defendant's vehicle was stopped at an administrative roadblock at
milepost 43 on U.S. 40 in Wasatch County, in the vicinity of Strawberry Reservoir.
2. Defendant was arrested at the roadblock on the basis of weapons and paraphernalia found
in his vehicle.
3. Inasmuch as the weapons confiscated at the roadblock appeared to match the description
of weapons earlier reported stolen in Duchesne County, a search warrant was obtained by the
Duchesne County Sheriffs office. The warrant was executed at Defendant's residence in Uintah

2
County on May 28, 1998, by officers of the Duchesne County Sheriffs Department and the Vernal
Police Department.
4.

Upon executing the warrant, officers found various weapons, drugs, and drug

paraphernalia. In consequence of the contraband found at Defendant's residence, criminal charges
were filed in the above-entitled matter regarding the theft of weapons and ammunition in Duchesne
County. Charges were also filed in Uintah County in consequence of the drugs and paraphernalia
found at the scene.
5. On July 8,1998, Defendant filed a motion in the Fourth District Court in Wasatch County
to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative roadblock held on May 23, 1998,
inasmuch as said roadblock was not established in accordance with the Utah or U.S. Constitutions,
nor in accordance with the notice requirements governing administrative roadblocks as set forth in
U.C.A. §77-23-100 et seq.
6. On December 2, 1998, Judge Guy R. Bummgham of the Fourth District Court granted
Defendant's motion to suppress. On December 3, 1998, the Wasatch County Attorney moved to
dismiss all charges in Wasatch County arising out ofthe May 23,1998, roadblock. The charges were
dismissed on or about December 9,1998.
ARGUMENT
As a matter of Res Judicata, all evidence obtained against the Defendant in Uintah County
supporting charges in Duchesne and Uintah Counties must be suppressed, inasmuch as it
constitutes the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is tainted by the illegality of the Wasatch
County search.
It is well established that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure must

3
be excluded. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Larocco,
794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990). Likewise, the exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence obtained
directly as result of the illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the illegality,
unless the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v.
Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The illegality of the roadblock in Wasatch County was
established by Judge Burningham's ruling. The illegality of the original roadblock applies in
Ehichesne and Uintah Counties as a matter oiresjudicatcL The warrant executed in Uintah County
was based entirely on evidence obtained through the illegal roadblock. Since that evidence could not
be admitted at trial in Wasatch County, it cannot be used as the basis for a warrant in Uintah and
Duchesne Counties. There was no other basis for the warrant other than the evidence obtained at the
roadblock, and thus there is no basis for the warrant sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint. AH evidence against the Defendant obtained pursuant to the warrant executed on May
28, 1998, must therefore be excluded in connection with the charges in Uintah and Duchesne
Counties.
DATED this 12th day of April, 1999.

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Defendant

ADDENDUM B

DISTRICT/-.
UINTAH rOK

•3Y.

Kenneth R. Wallentine, #5817
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
Telephone: (435)781-5435
Fax:
(435)781-5428
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Objection to Motion to Suppress

vs.
ALAN VAL MCDONALD,
DOB: 10/02/1958,

No. 991800030 FS
Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant.

The State objects to defendant's request to suppress the search conducted pursuant to
warrant of the 8th District Court. Defendant's argument rests entirely on the suppression of an
administrative traffic checkpoint due to an error in providing adequate notice of the checkpoint.
Defendant erroneously fails to address the facial validity of the warrant in this case.
Utah courts follow the good faith exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984). The Utah Court of Appeals
succinctly outlined the predicates requirements for the good faith exception in State v. Horton,
848 P.2d 708,711 (Utah App. 1993). "Evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith,
objectively and reasonably relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached

magistrate, need not be excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated by lack of
probable cause." Id. at 711. In determining whether the officer acted in "good faith" the
reviewing court departs from a "presumption that when an officer relies on a warrant, the officer
is acting in good faith." Id. at 711, citing United States v. Cardall, 111* F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th
Cir. 1985). As established by the Affidavit of Detective Dylan Rooks, the officers involved in
the execution of the search warrant at defendant's residence believed that they were acting on a
facially valid court order. They are thus entitled to the presumption of good faith.
Only four circumstances can effectively defeat this presumption, and none are present in
the instant case. If the officer's reliance on the warrant is "wholly unwarranted" then the officer
cannot be acting in good faith. Horton, 848 P.2d at 711. Detective Rooks' reliance on the
warrant was well-placed. He believed that the probable cause information had been obtained in
the course of a validly executed administrative traffic checkpoint. Affidavit of Dylan Rooks. He
had no reason to believe or even suspect that a judge would eventually suppress evidence
stemming from the traffic checkpoint due -not to any substantive violation of procedure or
respect for individual rights- merely to a lack of adequate notice. In Leon, the United States
Supreme Court characterized this possibility as an officer relying on a warrant so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render reliance on the warrant entirely unreasonable. Leon, 468
U.S. at 923. Although this is a matter of law for this Court to determine, it should be plain from
the face of the warrant that the judge had more than sufficient probable cause to issue the
warrant, and correspondingly, the officers had a surplus of probable cause on which to rely in
presuming the validity of the warrant.

The second circumstance which might defeat the presumption of good faith is found
when the magistrate is affirmatively mislead by an officer's reckless disregard for the truth.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. There has been no allegation of any misrepresentation. A third
possibility is the utter failure of the district court judge to remain neutral and impartial. Id.
Again, defendant has not alleged any such gross failure on the part of the Court. The final
condition for disregarding the presumption of good faith is when the warrant is so utterly lacking
in particularity of description that the executing officers could not identify the property sought.
Id. Once again, no such allegation has been raised.
The United States Supreme Court in Leon and the Utah Court of Appeals in Horton
adopted the presumptive good faith exception to the suppression doctrine to avoid the very
situation sought by defendant, that is suppression of evidence obtained by a warrant later
invalidated on a technicality. Indeed, to suppress the evidence in the present case would be
tantamount to suppression on a hypertechnicality once removed by the attenuation of an
interceding valid warrant. The standard for the good faith doctrine has been fully met and the
Court ought not suppress the evidence.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1999.

Kenneth R. Wallentine
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney

ADDENDUM C

JUL 1 n 1999

Kenneth R. Wallentine, #5817
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
Telephone: (435)781-5435
Fax:
(435)781-5428

__c!y.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Affidavit of Dylan Rooks

vs.
ALAN VAL MCDONALD,
DOB: 10/02/1958,

No. 991800030 FS
Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant.
Dylan Rooks, having personal knowledge of the matters contained herein and beingfirstduly
sworn, states as follows:
1.

I was the arresting officer in the instant case.

2.

On May 28th, 1998,1 assisted in the execution of a search warrant at defendant's

residence. Although I was generally familiar with the background facts stated in the affidavit, I did
not participate in the preparation of the application for the search warrant. I saw the warrant before
service and knew that it had been authorized by a judge of the 8th District Court. At the time of
service, I believed that there was sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant and believed that the
judge had acted correctly in issuing the warrant. I believed then and still believe that all relevant
facts concerning the probable cause statement were included in the affidavit. I believed then and
still believe that all statements were true and correct.

3.

I am not aware that any person has claimed that any facts were omitted or that any

misstatements or misrepresentations were presented to the Court in seeking the search warrant.
4.

I knew that a portion of the information contained in the affidavit of probable cause

was gathered in the course of an administrative traffic checkpoint conducted on May 23rd, 1998, on
U.S. Highway 40 in the vicinity of the Strawberry Reservoir. I participated in the administrative
traffic checkpoint. I knew that it was being conducted under the direction of supervisory personnel.
Prior to beginning the checkpoint, I attended a briefing during which the operational plan was
carefully explained and I was told that all officers would strictly adhere to the plan. I had
participated in other administrative traffic checkpoints and this particular checkpoint appeared to
be conducted in full compliance with the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act of 1992.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1999.

Detecti^Dylan Rooks
Vernal City Police Department
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
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)

On the 14th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before me, Dylan Rooks, who is known
to me or who was identified with suitable personal identification, and who signed on the preceding
document in my presence, and being first duly sworn (or affirmed), declared that the statements
therein contained are true.

l^OTARYPUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

